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Abstract
The issues and analyses in this issue of the Fordham International Law Journal provide excel-
lent cases for testing how a conventional approach would mediate current external pressures for
legal change on current international and foreign relations law commitments. As it turns out, the
results suggest that sovereigntist concerns are overblown, but that internationalist advocates ignore
them completely at their peril.
INTRODUCTION
"EXTERNAL" VERSUS "INTERNAL" IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Martin S. Flaherty*
Great social forces determine the path of the law. Unless, of
course, the law's internal logic redirects, reverses, or halts that
path. The tension between "external" and "internal" accounts of
legal change-"foreign" versus "domestic" in a less conventional
sense-has been around pretty much since the law itself and can
be seen almost anywhere. The internal/external debate domi-
nates legal history. To what extent, for example, did the move-
ment for a revolutionary commitment to equality after the Civil
War overcome antebellum conceptions embedded in doctrine?1
The dispute likewise characterizes the law today, nowhere more
so than in constitutional struggles. No sooner did the Cold War
end, and the need for national unity dissipate, than the Supreme
Court concocted various federalism doctrines directed at devolv-
ing federal power, a process that itself appears to have slowed in
light of the renewed need for national authority in light of
9/11.2 Last, and most relevant, the struggle between "foreign"
and "domestic" factors in this more abstract sense, plays out no-
where more dramatically than in international and foreign rela-
tions law.
The external, "foreign" pressures at play are nothing short
of epic, yet they do not cut in the same direction. Globalization,
in all its multi-faceted glory or horror, places obvious and inexo-
rable pressure for the greater legal integration of domestic re-
* Professor of Law & Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International
Human Rights, Fordham Law School; J.D., Columbia Law School; M.A, M.Phil, Yale
University; B.A., Princeton University.
1. Compare ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985) (ar-
guing that the Reconstruction Amendments incorporated a broad conception of na-
tional citizenship rights against U.S. states), with WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPAL TO LEGAL DOCTRINE (1988) (emphasizing the
persisting force of federalism limitations).
2. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be A Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277, 1277-78 (1999).
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gimes into transnational systems. The story is familiar enough.
The push for new capital and consumer markets, the demand
for labor, developments in technology and transportation, envi-
ronmental externalities, instantly available images exposing ge-
nocide and other atrocities, all fuel the need for common rules
on trade, finance, development, and the environment, not to
mention human rights and humanitarian law.3 Pushing in al-
most exactly the opposite direction, however, is the "global war
on terror," at least as pursued by the United States. The Na-
tion's security needs, at least as perceived by the Bush Adminis-
tration, point in the direction of going it alone through reliance
on U.S. military and economic primacy, an instinct otherwise
known as "American Exceptionalism."4 Among the first areas in
which this policy seeks exceptions to be made are exactly the
increasing set of international rules that globalization fosters.5
Facing these and other external forces are those internal
elements currently embedded in international law. These, too,
do not always push in the same direction. Even today, much of
international and foreign relations law resists out and out inter-
nationalism. This resistance starts with the premise of national
sovereignty itself. Formal safeguards of sovereignty remain in
such rules and practices as foreign sovereign immunity, the act
of state doctrine, and non-self-execution declarations in treaty
ratification. Yet functional ideas are sometimes just as powerful,
none more so than the idea of a "democratic deficit" as a
counter to transnational initiatives, such as the defeated Consti-
tutional Treaty of Europe.6 That said, international law is no
longer-and indeed never was-merely sovereigntist. In formal
terms, the exclusivity of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter as the
3. Cf Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 641-54 (1998).
4. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv.
1479 (2003). As Professor Koh notes, the term "American Exceptionalism" is thought
to have been originally coined by Alexis De Tocqueville. See 2 ALEXis DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36-37 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., A.A. Knopf
1948) (1835).
5. For a recent and grandiose defense of American Exceptionalism, see Stephen J.
Calebresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdhal, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law:
Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L.
Rev. 743 (2005).
6. But see Andrew Moravcsik, In Defense of the "Democratic Deficit" Reassessing Legiti-
macy in the European Union, 40J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 604-05 (2002) (debunking
the notion that the European Union lacks a sufficient democratic basis).
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only means for armed conflict (absent self-defense), human
rights conventions, and treaties as the "supreme law of the
land,"7 all serve greater global integration. More general func-
tional considerations once more reinforce these doctrinal rules.
In this regard, think of the general value typically placed on the
international "rule of law."8
All this should suggest that the conflict between the exter-
nal and the internal rarely will be straightforward. To the con-
trary, the effect will turn on both the nature of the outside pres-
sure and the character of the internal consideration. Start with
the premise that globalization pushes in an integrationist way.
Many internal rules, especially such sovereignty-based doctrines
as governmental immunity, will push back. But increasingly,
other doctrines will facilitate the phenomenon, including evolv-
ing customary international law. Conversely, turn to the con-
tested though current premise that the security of a hegemonic
State points toward sovereignty. Again, certain internal rules will
gain renewed vigor. Many others, however, will put up a fight.
Not least on this score would be the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to various aspects of the conflict.
Portraying these complex relationships, however, is merely
prologue. The real task becomes how and to what extent inter-
national and foreign relations law should accommodate outside
pressures without sacrificing the internal integrity that distin-
guishes them as law in the first place. In the first instance, the
question may be more the province of legal philosophers than
international lawyers. A conventional lawyerly approach may
still be worth pursuing, if only to see how the law might and
might not mediate the high stakes trends of modern foreign af-
fairs. A typical mainstream approach would posit at least two
general conditions before external pressure could effect change
on internal legal norms absent some deliberate alteration of
norms through recognized legislative or constitutional
processes. First, material change could not occur where a for-
mal legal rule is reasonably clear and settled. Second, even in
the absence of formal barriers, significant adaptation in an inter-
nal legal regime cannot take place unless relevant underlying
7. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
8. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, International Law in National Courts: The International
Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 19 (2003).
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and strongly-held functional values are addressed.' Though
there are myriad demons in the details, only when these general
conditions are satisfied is any external change likely to be seen as
legitimate, or even successful.
The issues and analyses in this issue of the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal provide excellent cases for testing how a con-
ventional approach would mediate current external pressures
for legal change on current international and foreign relations
law commitments. As it turns out, the results suggest that sover-
eigntist concerns are overblown, but that internationalist advo-
cates ignore them completely at their peril.
Consider first the current controversy over U.S. judges rely-
ing on international and comparative law in the interpretation
of domestic law.1 ° At least in its recent accelerated and high-
profile form, the practice owes a good deal to the external force
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter has termed 'judicial globaliza-
tion."1 Just as clearly, there is no established internal rule in
U.S. law prohibiting it. To the contrary, much in our legal order
supports judicial reliance on "foreign" law. The Founding dis-
played a strong internationalist side that has since become a hall-
mark of fledgling republics. 2 Internationalist doctrines in re-
lated areas remain well-established, such as the Charming Betsy
canon that ambiguous statutes be construed consistent with in-
ternational law."3 Substantial precedent from the eighteenth
9. Cf Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1813-14
(1996) (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court applies constitutional norms to
changed circumstances).
10. See, e.g., DonaldJ. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party
of International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocation of Foreign and International
Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 507 (2006).
11. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000).
12. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understand-
ing, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land, "99 COLUM L. REv. 2095, 2120-26 (1999); see
also David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1697, 1701-02 (2003) (arguing that early constitu-
tional history indicates the Framers' internationalist tendencies); Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 197 (2003) (observing that
courts of fledgling States have long had to borrow from external legal sources).
13. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(stating that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions if any other possible construction remains").
[Vol. 29:447
INTRODUCTION
through the twentieth century further support the practice. 14
Conversely, not a few of the objections to the phenomenon are
trivial. Legal materials from non-U.S. countries present no
greater-and in practice almost certainly less-temptation to
misuse than do historical materials, which tend to be a favorite
source of judicial globalization's staunchest critics.
That said, the democratic objections are not so easily dis-
missed. As Professor Donald J. Kochan indicates in Sovereignty
and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law:
The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocation of Foreign and Interna-
tional Law, the more international and comparative materials ap-
pear to drive decisions, the more their use raises legitimate con-
cerns as to reliance on legal norms that have never received as-
sent either from "We the People" of the United States or "we the
electorate."15 These underlying functional values, moreover, res-
onate, evidenced by the as yet unsuccessful congressional at-
tempts to enact a formal prohibition. 6 So far, defenders ofjudi-
cial borrowing have simply failed to grapple with this functional
challenge at all, much less convincingly. Until defenses
grounded in democratic concerns are on offer, the practice will
remain controversial, if only in the United States. Fortunately,
there are several promising justifications for use of "foreign" law
precisely on democratic grounds. The challenge remains devel-
oping these.' 7
Domestic enforcement of treaty obligations presents an-
other timely issue, but with different dynamics. Here, the domi-
14. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALEJ. INT'L
L. 1 (2006).
15. See Kochan, supra note 10; see also Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnational-
ism, the GlobalizedJudiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 345,
367 (2005); see also Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARv.
L. REV. 148, 154 (2005).
16. See, e.g., American Justice for Americans Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong.
§ 3 (2005) (House Resolution attempting to prohibit the use of most non-U.S. legal
sources in interpreting the U.S. Constitution); American Justice for Americans Citizens
Act, H.R. 4118,108th Cong. § 3 (2004) (same); 150 Cong. Rec. E512 (2004) (Statement
of Representative Ron Paul (R-Tex.) on the introduction of American Justice for Ameri-
can Citizens Act).
17. For initial attempts, see Martin S. Flaherty, Separation of Powers in a Global Con-
text, in JUDGES, TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF STE-
PHEN LIVINGSTONE (John Morrison & Colin Harvey, eds., forthcoming 2006) and Martin
S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 ETHICS AND INT'L AFF.
(forthcoming 2006).
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nant external pressures come not from globalization, but from
the "global war on terror." The result has been sovereigntist as-
sertions with a vengeance. The Geneva Conventions do not es-
tablish rights enforceable in U.S. courts."i Nor does the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. The Alien Tort Statute like-
wise does not create a federal cause of action for violations of
international law.' 9 And perhaps most notoriously, the Execu-
tive may "suspend" treaty obligations, even when Congress has
incorporated them into domestic law, as violations of the Com-
mander-in-Chief and Executive Vesting Clauses.2
Standing against this assault are clear internal rules and es-
tablished functional values. As the Supremacy Clause makes
plain, treaties at the very least are to be presumed self-execut-
ing.21 The Supremacy Clause, moreover, reflects the previously-
noted Founding appreciation of international law, which was no-
where more strongly held than with regard to treaty commit-
ments. Out of this same orientation developed exceptionally
clear practices in which U.S. courts readily interpreted treaties as
creating individual rights, consistently fashioned remedies to vin-
dicate those rights, and almost invariably refused to defer to the
Executive in treaty interpretation.2 These formal doctrines and
precedents themselves reflected a functional commitment to the
international rule of law as a means for the Nation to protect its
18. See Brief of Respondent at 30, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (Feb. 23,
2006), 2006 WL 460875, at *30. For that matter, the Conventions do not apply to "non-
state actors," including both Common Article 3 and the Third Geneva Convention's
requirement for a hearing concerning unlawful combatant status.
19. The Supreme Court of course rejected this position in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (stating that the Alien Tort Statute "is best read as having
been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of
action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for per-
sonal liability at the time").
20. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant U.S. Att'y Gen., &
RobertJ. Delahunty, Special Counsel to William J. Haynes If, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't
of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38 (KarenJ.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
21. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 12, at 2126; Carlos Manuel Vdsquez, Laughing at
Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. Rxv. 2154 (1999). But see John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitu-
tion: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955,
2091-94 (1999) (arguing that the original understanding of the Constitution supports a
presumption against the self-execution of treaties).
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 cmt. 5 (observing that U.S. courts have consistently vindicated treaty-based
rights and listing supporting case law).
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interests and security in a dangerous world. Countervailing in-
ternal considerations apply, but they are far less plausible. As
Professor John Quigley demonstrates in Toward More Effective Ju-
dicial Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights,23 formal sovereigntist
prohibitions in this area appear non-existent or off-point.24 Op-
posing functional values also appear comparatively weak. To
take one example, democracy concerns might cut against an
overly monist approach to domestic treaty enforcement. Yet,
such concerns were precisely what the Founders rejected in their
formal commitment to self-executing treaties and associated doc-
trines.25 It follows that those who seek the radical departure of
creating a dualist system with regard to treaties shoulder a sub-
stantial burden.26
Still another issue at the law's frontier involves criminal
prosecution for violations of humanitarian law, especially in
transnational forums. More than most areas, the story here will
vary, situation to situation. Yet, as a general matter, the issue
tends to place internal and external considerations in tension
when each set it at its strongest. Dominant external influence in
this area has militated in favor of outside enforcement when all
else fails, as illustrated by the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, not to mention the International
Criminal Court. Such influence has sprung from a powerful
combination of factors, including: the end of the Cold War and
the possibility of transnational enforcement, the power of tele-
vised images of atrocities, and the perceived danger that geno-
cide even in remote corners of the world threatens peace and
stability. Resisting all this is a likewise powerful array of formal
and functional factors in any given internal legal system that
prize local control of law enforcement as a central tenet of the
23. John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights,
29 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 552 (2006).
24. See id.; see also Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Trans-
national Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1989, 1992-96 (2004).
25. See Flaherty, supra note 12, at 2112-20.
26. Conversely, concerns about self-government are more salient with regard to
the question of whether U.S. courts should automatically apply judgments of interna-
tional tribunals interpreting U.S. treaty obligations. When, however, treaties that the
United States has signed and ratified call for such deference, democratic objections
would correspondingly diminish. The Supreme Court will address exactly these issues
in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 620 (U.S.
Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 04-10566) and Bnstillo v. Johnson, No. 042023 (Va. Mar. 7, 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 621 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-51).
2006] 453
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rule of law. Formal rules typically take the form of criminal stat-
utes, rules of evidence, statutes of limitations, and due process
protections typically tailored to local circumstances. These
rules, in turn, typically spring from underlying functional values
that privilege local control of this core aspect of law in the first
place. This is one reason why, at least in federal systems, the
baseline presumption is that criminal justice should be devolved
rather than centralized.
This standoff suggests variations on a theme of supple-
mentarity. The International Criminal Court embodies a gen-
eral, passive version. Under the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court,27 domestic courts enforce international
law in the first instance, and only where no good faith prosecu-
tion proceeds should international mechanisms come in.2"
When, however, domestic failure is systemic, not just an ad hoc,
but a hybrid ad hoc system seemingly offers the best promise.
Just this hope underpins the experiment in Sierra Leone and
the still prospective attempt in Cambodia. As with any hybrid,
efforts of this sort ideally address the concerns of the opposing
factors that made their creation necessary. From the internal
perspective, a hybrid tribunal should to the greatest extent possi-
ble retain both domestic personnel and procedures to honor the
internal legal commitments of a given regime. Conversely, ex-
ternal contributions should, among other things, include suffi-
cient due process protections, assistance with arrest and incar-
ceration, and basic infrastructure funding. In this light, the
early returns on the Sierra Leone experience in particular are
troubling. As Professor Chandra Lekha Sriram reports in Wrong-
Sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone,2 9
the experiment has managed to find the worst of both the exter-
nal and internal worlds. The body lacks sufficient outside fund-
ing, even by the meager standards of the non-hybrid tribunals
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia." ° It also suffers from the
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
28. See Douglas E. Edlin, The Anxiety of Sovereignty: Britain, The United States and the
International Criminal Court, 29 B.C. Irr'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2006) (noting that the
International Criminal Court only assumes jurisdiction over trials for specific crimes
when a national judiciary is unwilling or unable to proceed).
29. Chandra Lekha Sriram, Wrong-Sizing InternationalJustice? The Hybrid Tribunal in
Sierra Leone, 29 FoRDHAm INT'L. L.J. 472 (2006).
30. Id. at 482.
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perception of being essentially a foreign rather than domestic
institution.3 ' None of this is to say that such hybrid experiments
are doomed to failure. Rather, the cautionary tale suggests that
a much greater effort is required to insure the best of the exter-
nal and internal worlds.
Customary international law offers one further leading edge
of legal debate. That this is so is curious. The exponential
growth of treaty law since World War II has left little room for
the application of international custom. So too has the domi-
nance of positivist conceptions of the law in general. The forces
of globalization operate to expand customary international law
nonetheless, especially with regard to human rights. At least in
the United States, the internal strictures of the domestic legal
regime traditionally welcomed rather than resisted international
custom. The U.S. Constitution, to be sure, does not privilege
customary law in the way it sanctions treaties. Yet conventional
sources do strongly support a place for customary international
law as part of U.S. federal law, including Founding understand-
ings, persistent practice, and case law old and new. In Transna-
tional Common Laws,3 2 Professor H. Patrick Glenn goes these con-
siderations one better. Whereas customary international law
rests on the behavior and commitment of Nation-States, Profes-
sor Glenn's Essay reminds us that vast sources of international
norms-what he terms transnational common law-has long
transcended Nation-States altogether.
Yet once more, not everything points the same way. As with
judicial globalization, criminal prosecution, and even treaty en-
forcement, functional concerns about democratic self-govern-
ment intrude. These concerns have resonated as customary in-
ternational law endures and expands. In part, objections stem
from the "mysterious" ways international custom solidifies.33 At
least in the United States, resistance further results from the per-
ception that the judges who identify and apply customary inter-
31. Id. at 489-91.
32. H. Patrick Glenn, Transnational Common Laws, 29 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 457
(2006).
33. See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1566 (1984) (noting that "[tihe process by which customary law is created is
hardly certain"); see also Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA.
J. INT'L L. 449, 449 (2000) (criticizing the lack of common agreement on how custom-
ary international law is formed).
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national law lack sufficient democratic pedigree. 34 As in related
areas, internationalists ignore these concerns at international
law's peril. This is not to say, however, that what peril exists can-
not be addressed and avoided.
Judicial globalization, domestic treaty enforcement, transna-
tional criminal prosecution, and international and transnational
custom count among the principle areas in which the external
pressures of foreign affairs developments meet the internal com-
mitments of domestic legal systems. On balance, both the pres-
sures from without and, perhaps to a surprising degree, the im-
perative from within, foster and embrace further international
cooperation-provisional responses to terrorism notwithstand-
ing. The process, more than ever, will require persistence and
consideration rather than premature triumphalism.
34. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack N. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319 (1997). But see CHRISTOPHERJ.
EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 46-49 (2001) (discussing the need to
clarify the requirements of democracy before subjecting doctrines and institutions to
democratically-based critiques).
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